

Testable implications of general equilibrium models: An integer programming approach*

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Abstract

Focusing on the testable revealed preference restrictions on the equilibrium manifold, we show that the rationalizability problem is *NP*-complete. Subsequently, we present a mixed integer programming (MIP) approach to characterizing the testable implications of general equilibrium models. Attractively, this MIP approach naturally applies to settings with any number of observations and any number of agents. This is in contrast with existing approaches in the literature. Moreover, the MIP approach can easily analyze alternative general equilibrium models that include, for instance, public goods, assignable information and/or production. We apply our methodology to a data set drawn from the US economy. In this application, an important focus is on the discriminatory power of the rationalizability tests under study.

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1 Motivation

We introduce a mixed integer programming (MIP) approach to verify the revealed preference characterizations of general equilibrium models. Attractively, this approach naturally

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deals with any number of observations and/or agents. We show that our basic model can easily be extended to include public goods and production. We also present an empirical application that demonstrates the practical usefulness of our approach. To our knowledge, this is the first application that verifies the general equilibrium rationalizability conditions on a real data set. This introductory section motivates our research questions and summarizes our main contributions.

The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu result can be summarized in the following way: any real valued function of prices that satisfies Walras' law, continuity and homogeneity of degree zero is the excess demand function of some economy with at least as many agents as commodities. This celebrated result led to the rather depressing viewpoint that general equilibrium is unable to generate falsifiable predictions. From a Popperian perspective, this would label general equilibrium theory as unscientific.

Brown and Matzkin (1996), however, showed that if we focus on the equilibrium manifold,¹ and not on the excess demand function, then the pure exchange model has strong nonparametric empirical restrictions. Towards this end, they focus on the nonparametric revealed preference implications in the tradition of Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). Their main results characterize the finite data sets consisting of equilibrium prices, aggregate endowments and individual incomes, for which there exist continuous, concave and non-satiated utility functions such that the observed prices correspond to some equilibrium price vector for the pure exchange economy associated with the given endowments. More precisely, these utility functions exist if and only if there exist individual consumption bundles such that: (i) individual expenditure equals individual income, (ii) individual consumption bundles sum to aggregate endowments, and (iii) for each individual there exist a solution for the corresponding Afriat inequalities. Moreover, they demonstrated that these restrictions are non-vacuous. If a given data set satisfies the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), then this data set is said to be rationalizable.

Requirements (i) and (ii) are expressed as linear equalities and can therefore easily be verified by linear programming methods. Unfortunately, requirement (iii) has a quadratic form. In order to circumvent this problem, Brown and Matzkin make use of a deep result from semi-algebraic theory: the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem. This theorem states that every first-order formula over the real fields can be reduced to an equivalent quantifier-free formula. Moreover, this reduction can be established in finite time. Using this theorem, Brown and Matzkin conclude that it is possible to decide in finite time whether a solution to (i), (ii) and (iii) exists.

Subsequent research has extended the result to models including production (Carvajal, 2005), Pareto optimal provision of public goods (Snyder, 1999), financial markets (Kübler, 2003), random preferences (Carvajal, 2004), Pareto efficient and individual rational allocations (Bachmann, 2006), models with interdependent preferences (Deb, 2009) and externalities (Carvajal, 2009).² The usual approach adopted in these studies is as follows. First, it

¹The equilibrium manifold is the set of prices and individual endowments for which the excess demand function is zero.

²We refer to Carvajal (2004) for an extensive overview of the literature.

is demonstrated that there exist wellbehaved utility functions that rationalize the data for the economy under consideration if and only if there exists some set of variables satisfying a certain collection of polynomial inequalities. Second, making use of the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem on quantifier elimination, it is inferred that the issue of rationalizability can be resolved in finite time. Third, a counterexample is provided, affirming the non-triviality of the collection of derived polynomial inequalities.

Although these results clearly demonstrate the conditions for which a given data set can belong to the equilibrium manifold, a disadvantage of the complexity of this approach is that one can only consider settings with a small number of agents and/or a limited number of observations. In their original paper, Brown and Matzkin (1996) show how to use the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm in order to derive the testable restrictions for general equilibrium models with 2 agents and 2 observations. Unfortunately, the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm is, for worst time complexity, at best doubly exponential in the number of quantifiers to be eliminated. Hence, the use of this approach is computationally very inefficient even for moderate sized problems (see also Brown and Matzkin (1996) for a discussion on this issue). Most studies remain quite negligent on the issue concerning the practical verification of these conditions. A notable exception is the algorithm proposed by Brown and Kannan (2008). This algorithm enumerates every possible preference relation of all individuals over the different observations and verifies for each profile —via linear programming techniques— whether these preferences lead to a rationalization. The algorithm is exponential in both the number of observations and the number of individuals.

The computational inefficiency of the aforementioned algorithms raises the question whether there exists an algorithm that can verify the rationalizability question efficiently, i.e. in a polynomial number of steps. In Section 3, we show that, unless $P = NP$, the answer is no. In particular, the verification of restrictions of the Brown and Matzkin characterization is an NP -complete problem.³ This result implies that one should not waste time trying to construct a polynomial time algorithm that verifies the rationalizability question —unless one has taken up the ambitious task of showing that $P = NP$. In turn, it gives a strong argument in favor of searching for a widely applied and ‘efficient’ non-polynomial time algorithm, to verify the rationalizability conditions and to open the way for introducing heuristics that can give quick (but possible inconclusive) answers.

In this paper, we suggest an easy-to-implement (non-polynomial time) procedure to check the rationalizability conditions.⁴ By exploiting the equivalence between the existence of Afriat inequalities and the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference,⁵ we show how to transform condition (iii) of Brown and Matzkin into a set of linear restrictions with mixed integer variables; i.e., we apply a mixed integer programming (MIP) procedure to characterize testable implications of general equilibrium models. Such a MIP approach has proven very useful in the literature of collective consumption models, which studies the behavior of multi-person households. See Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe, and Vermeulen (2008)

³We refer to Garey and Johnson (1979) for an introduction into the theory of NP -completeness.

⁴We will only briefly touch upon the possible use of corresponding heuristics. See an earlier version of this paper (Cherchye, Demuyck, and De Rock, 2009b) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

⁵See Section 2 for formal definitions.

and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2009a) for MIP characterizations of collective consumption models. We extend these insights to a general equilibrium setting.

From a theoretical point of view, the core motivation for adopting a MIP approach is that this is a widely accepted and a well known approach to handle *NP*-complete problems. Besides this, we also have a number of other motivations for our MIP approach. Most notably, it allows us to avoid the use of the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm to eliminate the quantifiers. Although in theory this algorithm can handle data sets with any number of observations, existing applications in the context of general equilibrium models restrict their analysis to data sets with only 2 observations. Moreover, when using the Tarski-Seidenberg approach, the analysis for one general equilibrium model is not straightforwardly extended to another model (that accounts, e.g., for different types of assignable information, public goods and/or production). Given this, an important argument pro our MIP approach is that it provides a versatile framework for analyzing testable implications of general equilibrium models. For example, in Section 3 our characterizations of general equilibrium models *à la* Brown and Matzkin naturally apply to any number of observations and agents. We further show that we can provide straightforward extensions of the basic MIP characterizations towards alternative models with different types of assignable information, public goods and/or production.

We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our MIP approach by means of an application to data drawn from the US economy. As indicated above, this is –as far as we know– the first application of rationalizability tests of general equilibrium models to real data. Using data on prices and aggregate consumption levels, we verify the revealed preference conditions for an economy with 8 US regions that are observed 12 times. In fact, Brown and Matzkin (1996) suggest the use of cross-sectional data for sampled regions as a typical application setting for the testable conditions under consideration. In such a setting, one can think of different agents within the same region as being of the same type, representing groups of consumers with the same tastes and incomes. We consider rationalizability in terms of alternative general equilibrium models (with and without a public good, and with alternative degrees of assignable information). Our tests conclude that our data set is rationalizable in terms of the different models under consideration. An important concern for the type of tests that we focus on is the possible lack of power. Therefore, as an additional analysis, we calculate the probability that the alternative hypothesis of random behavior is effectively detected by our tests. We find that the lack of discriminatory power depends to a large extent on the amount of ‘assignable’ information that is included in the revealed preference tests.

As a final remark, we emphasize that our following analysis may be instrumental for many different settings. Chiappori, Ekeland, Kübler, and Polemarchakis (2004) claim that general equilibrium analysis does not only apply to ‘large economies’, but also to ‘small group behavior’ of households, committees, clubs, villages and other local organization. See also Rizvi (2006) and Brown and Kannan (2008) for more discussion on meaningful empirical applications of general equilibrium models in alternative contexts.

The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by briefly recapturing Afriat (1967)’s theorem, which characterizes rationalizable behavior in terms of Afriat inequali-

ties, and by introducing the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Section 3 presents the *NP*-completeness result, and provides a MIP characterization of general equilibrium behavior in a pure exchange economy with assignable incomes; this is the case that was originally considered by Brown and Matzkin (1996). We further discuss the possibility of relaxing the condition of fully assignable income and we show that it is possible to include information on assignable consumption quantities. We end the section by showing how to adapt the rationalizability conditions to incorporate production and public goods. Section 4 presents our application to data set drawn from the US economy. Section 5 concludes and discusses some further extensions of our MIP approach.

2 Preliminaries

We consider a setting with $|J|$ goods, $J = \{1, \dots, |J|\}$, and a finite data set $S = \{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T}$ existing of $|J|$ -dimensional price vectors $p_t \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{|J|}$ and $|J|$ -dimensional quantity vectors $q_t \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|J|}$. The set $T = \{1, \dots, |T|\}$ corresponds to the set of observations. A utility function $u : \mathbb{R}_+^{|J|} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is wellbehaved if it is concave, continuous and strict monotone. The following definition is standard.

Definition 1. A data set $\{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T}$ is rationalizable by a well-behaved utility function u if for all $t \in T$:

$$q_t \in \arg \max_{\{q : \langle p_t, q \rangle \leq \langle p_t, q_t \rangle\}} u(q),$$

In what follows, we will mainly focus on the nonparametric Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP); Varian (1982) has shown that GARP is a necessary and sufficient condition for the data set $\{p_t, q_t\}_{t=1, \dots, |T|}$ to be rationalizable.

Definition 2. A data $\{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP if and only if we can construct relations R_0, R such that

- (i) for all $t, s \in T$, if $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle \geq \langle p_t, q_s \rangle$ then $q_t R_0 q_s$;
- (ii) for all $t, s, u, \dots, r, v \in T$, if $q_t R_0 q_s$, $q_s R_0 q_u$, \dots , and $q_r R_0 q_v$ then $q_t R q_v$;
- (iii) for all $t, s \in T$, if $q_t R q_s$, then $\langle p_s, q_s \rangle \leq \langle p_s, q_t \rangle$.

Condition (i) states that the quantities q_t are directly revealed preferred over q_s ($q_t R_0 q_s$) if q_t was chosen when q_s was equally attainable ($\langle p_t, q_t \rangle \geq \langle p_t, q_s \rangle$); q_t are strict directly revealed preferred over q_s if the strict inequality holds. Similarly, we will also often state that the agent directly revealed prefers observation t over s . Next, condition (ii) imposes transitivity on the revealed preference relation R . Finally, condition (iii) states that if a consumption bundle q_t is revealed preferred to a consumption bundle q_s , then q_s cannot be more expensive than q_t .

The following well-known theorem states the conditions that a data set has to satisfy in order to be rationalizable (see Afriat (1967), Varian (1982)).

Theorem 1. *Let $S = \{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T}$ be a set of observations. The following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *There exist a wellbehaved utility function that rationalizes S ;*
- (ii) *S satisfies GARP;*
- (iii) *There exist numbers $\{\phi_t\}_{t \in T} \geq 0$ and $\{\lambda_t\}_{t \in T} > 0$ such that for all $t, s \in T$:*

$$\phi_t \leq \phi_s + \lambda_s (\langle p_s, q_t \rangle - \langle p_s, q_s \rangle);$$

Condition (ii) recaptures the result of Varian (1982). Condition (iii) provides an equivalent characterization in terms of the Afriat inequalities, which allow an explicit construction of the utility levels associated with each observation t (i.e., utility level ϕ_t for observed quantities q_t).

We end this section by providing a fifth equivalent to the above theorem, i.e. an integer programming (IP) characterization of GARP. To do so, we introduce the binary variables $x_{s,t} \in \{0, 1\}$.⁶ Consider then the following set of constraints:⁷

Program (CS.I).

- (i) $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle - \langle p_t, q_s \rangle < x_{t,s} A_t \quad (t, s \in T);$
- (ii) $x_{t,s} + x_{s,v} \leq 1 + x_{t,v} \quad (t, s, v \in T);$
- (iii) $(x_{t,s} - 1) A_s \leq \langle p_s, q_t \rangle - \langle p_s, q_s \rangle \quad (t, s \in T).$

Where the constants A_t are given real numbers that satisfy $A_t \geq \langle p_t, q_t \rangle$ for all $t \in T$.

When we interpret $x_{t,s}$ as $q_t R_0 q_s$, we easily observe the similarity between the above rules and the ones in Definition 2. The following proposition then formally states the wanted result; i.e., for a given data set $S = \{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T}$, finding a solution (in terms of the binary variables $x_{s,t}$) for this CS.I program is equivalent to S satisfying GARP.

Proposition 1. *Let $S = \{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T}$ be a set of observations. The following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *S satisfies CS.I;*
- (ii) *S satisfies GARP.*

⁶To be precise, given that $x_{s,t}$ are the only integer variables that we use, we are actually using binary integer programming.

⁷The strict inequality $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle - \langle p_t, q_s \rangle < x_{t,s} A_t$ is difficult to use in MIP analysis. Therefore, in practice we can replace it with $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle - \langle p_t, q_s \rangle + \varepsilon \leq x_{t,s} A_t$ for $\varepsilon > 0$ arbitrarily small.

Proof. Suppose there exists a solution for program CS.I. If $q_t R_0 q_s$, which follows from $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle \geq \langle p_t, q_s \rangle$, then condition (i) of CS.I implies that $x_{t,s} = 1$. Next, if $q_t R q_v$, which follows from some sequence $q_t R_0 q_s, q_s R_0 q_u, \dots$, and $q_r R_0 q_v$, then $x_{t,v} = 1$ by condition (ii) of CS.I. Finally, if $q_t R q_s$, and thus $x_{t,s} = 1$, then the right hand side of condition (iii) of CS.I must be positive (i.e. $\langle p_s, q_t \rangle \geq \langle p_s, q_s \rangle$). Thus, we can conclude that S satisfies GARP.

Suppose then that S satisfies GARP and define $x_{s,t}$ as follows: $x_{s,t} = 1 \Leftrightarrow q_s R q_t$. Let us show that this is a solution for CS.I. By construction, condition (i) of CS.I is only restrictive if its left hand side is positive (i.e. $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle \geq \langle p_t, q_s \rangle$); but then $x_{s,t} = 1$ and thus rule (i) is satisfied. Condition (ii) of CS.I is met because of the transitivity of R . Finally, again by construction, condition (iii) is only restrictive if its left hand side is zero (i.e. $x_{t,s} = 1$); but then rule (iii) of GARP implies that the right hand side is also non-negative. This shows that we obtained a solution for CS.I. \square

Theorem 1 together with Proposition 1 gives us three distinct ways to verify whether a given data set $S = \{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T}$ is rationalizable: (i) via the definition of GARP, (ii) via the Afriat inequalities, and (iii) using CS.I. In what follows, we will compare the efficiency of these different methods for testing whether a given data set is rationalizable in terms of the models in the subsequent sections. Therefore, it is important to discuss them a bit more in detail.

The first method was originally suggested by Varian (1982), and therefore we call it the VARIAN-method. The method consists of three steps, which comply with the three conditions in Definition 2 of GARP. The first step constructs the relation R_0 from the data set $S = \{p_t, q_t\}_{t=1, \dots, |T|}$. In particular $q_t R_0 q_s$ if and only if $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle \geq \langle p_t, q_s \rangle$. A second step computes the transitive closure of R_0 , i.e. the relation R . Varian (1982) suggests using Warshall's algorithm (Warshall, 1962), which is an efficient algorithm for computing transitive closures. The third step verifies $\langle p_t, q_t \rangle \leq \langle p_t, q_s \rangle$ whenever $q_s R q_t$. If this is the case, the data set satisfies GARP and is, therefore, rationalizable. Due to its efficiency, the VARIAN-method is very popular in applied work.

The second method verifies the rationalizability conditions by testing feasibility of the corresponding Afriat inequalities (i.e. condition (iii) of Theorem 1). These inequalities are linear in the unknowns ϕ_i and λ_i ($i \in \{1, \dots, T\}$) which implies that their feasibility can be verified using elementary linear programming methods. We refer to Afriat (1967) and Diewert (1973) for discussions of this method. We call it the AFRIAT-method. An advantage of this method is that it provides not only an efficient way to verify the rationalizability conditions but also, via the computed values of ϕ_i and λ_i , an estimate for the associated utility levels.

The third method verifies the rationalizability conditions via the conditions in CS.I. These conditions are linear in the unknown binary variables $x_{s,t}$. Therefore feasibility can be verified by standard integer programming (IP) methods (branch and bound, cutting plane, etc.). We refer to this method as the IP-method. Compared to the other methods, it is very inefficient and should not be recommended for applied work for the model developed in this section. However, in contrast to the other two methods, the IP method will be very

useful in combination with the other restrictions of general equilibrium models. This will be discussed in the next section.

3 The MIP approach to general equilibrium settings

3.1 Pure exchange economies with assignable incomes

As in the previous section, we assume that there are $|J|$ goods and $|T|$ observations, but now we consider a pure exchange economy with $|N|$ individual agents, $N = \{1, \dots, |N|\}$. Each individual is endowed with a well-behaved utility function. The collection of these utility functions is denoted by $\{u^i\}_{i \in N}$. In each period t , we endow each individual i with an income I_t^i . Aggregate endowments in period t are given by a $|J|$ -dimensional vector ε_t . The following concepts will be used throughout the paper.

Definition 3. For given $\{u^i\}_{i=1, \dots, |N|}$ and $\{\varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T}$, we define

- (i) $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is a feasible allocation if $q_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|J|}$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{|N|} q_t^i = \varepsilon_t$;
- (ii) $\{p_t, q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is a competitive equilibrium if $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is a feasible allocation, $q_t^i \in \arg \max_{\langle p_t, q \rangle \leq \langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle} u^i(q)$ and $p_t \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^J$. The prices p_t are called the equilibrium prices.

In words, condition (i) states the market clearing condition for each observation t ; i.e., the quantities q_t^i allocated to the individuals i must add up to the aggregate endowment ε_t . Such an allocation represents a competitive equilibrium if, for given prices p_t , each q_t^i maximizes the utility of individual i ; see condition (ii).

Brown and Matzkin (1996) start from observations on the set of equilibrium prices $\{p_t\}_{t \in T}$, the set of aggregate endowments $\{\varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T}$ (or, equivalently, aggregate consumption) and a set of individual incomes $\{I_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$. The following definition extends the earlier rationalizability concept to this general equilibrium context.

Definition 4. A data set $S = \{p_t, I_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved utility functions $\{u^i\}_{i \in N}$ and a feasible allocation $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ such that for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$:

- (i) $\langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle = I_t^i$;
- (ii) $\{p_t, q_t^i\}_{i \in N}$ is a competitive equilibrium.

Compared to Definition 1, this definition accounts for $|N|$ individuals instead of one. Condition (i) imposes the budget constraints implied by the observed individual incomes. Next, condition (ii) gives the corresponding competitive equilibrium requirement.

The next theorem recaptures the main result of Brown and Matzkin.

Theorem 2. A data set $\{p_t, I_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is rationalizable if and only if for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$ there exist numbers $\phi_t^i \geq 0$, $\lambda_t^i > 0$ and vectors $q_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|J|}$ such that:

$$(3.1) \quad \sum_{i=1}^N q_t^i = \varepsilon_t;$$

$$(3.2) \quad \langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle = I_t^i;$$

$$(3.3) \quad \phi_t^i \leq \phi_s^i + \lambda_s^i (\langle p_s, q_t^i \rangle - I_s^i).$$

Requirements (3.1) and (3.2) have been discussed before; requirement (3.3) captures the corresponding individual Afriat inequalities introduced in Theorem 1.

As indicated above, a main motivation for the MIP approach developed in this paper is that verifying the restrictions in Theorem 2 is an *NP*-complete problem. Let us start by giving the suitable decision problem. For any numbers $|N|, |J|$ and $|T| \in \mathbb{N}$ and a data set $S = \{p_t, I_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$, the problem *RATIONALIZABILITY* asks whether there exist vectors $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ such that conditions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) of Theorem 2 are satisfied. The next theorem provides a formal statement of our result. We refer to the Appendix for the proof.

Theorem 3. The decision problem *RATIONALIZABILITY* is *NP*-complete.

Thus, one should not focus on constructing polynomial time algorithms for testing the conditions in Theorem 2. By contrast, the result suggests that a more fruitful avenue consists in developing easy-to-implement and versatile non-polynomial time algorithms. This is exactly the approach that we follow in this paper. For completeness, we must stress that the rationalizability problem may allow for polynomial time verification for more specific general equilibrium settings; but studying such more specific cases falls beyond the scope of the current paper.

The starting point of our MIP method is given by the result in Proposition 1, which allows us to reformulate Theorem 2 by using the program CS.I.

Proposition 2. A data set $\{p_t, I_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is rationalizable if and only if for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$ there exist vectors $q_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|J|}$ such that:

$$(3.4) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{|N|} q_t^i = \varepsilon_t;$$

$$(3.5) \quad \langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle = I_t^i;$$

$$(3.6) \quad \{p_t, q_t^i\} \text{ satisfies CS.I.}$$

Of course, in light of Proposition 1, we could have replaced condition (3.6) by the requirement that for all i : $\{p_t, q_t^i\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP.

It would appear that the three methods for solving the rationalizability question that we discussed in the previous section (i.e. the *VARIAN*-, *AFRIAT*- and *IP*-method) can still be applied in this setting. However, this is not true. First of all, the *VARIAN*-method is no

longer feasible. Indeed, as we no longer observe the quantities q_t^i , we are no longer able to construct the revealed preference relation R_0 , which is needed in order to use Warshall's algorithm. Second, concerning the AFRIAT-method, observe that the Afriat inequalities in requirement (3.3) are quadratic since we have no observations on either λ_s^i or q_t^i . This turns the AFRIAT-method into verifying the feasibility for a set of quadratic inequalities, a problem that could be solved by using techniques for solving linear programs with quadratic constraints (LPQC). Finally using our IP-method we see that the integer programming problem is changed into a mixed integer program (MIP). Indeed, the inequalities in CS.I remains linear even if the quantities q_t^i are unobserved. However, in this case, the linear inequalities contains both variables that are binary valued and variables that are real valued. Nevertheless, as is well known, MIP problems can be solved more efficiently than LPQC problems.⁸ This makes the IP-method (translated into a MIP setting) the most preferred solution method for the model in this section.

From elementary MIP theory, we know that we can always verify in finite time whether a given MIP problem is feasible. However, it is well-known that solving a MIP problem may become computationally hard if the number of binary variables gets large. For such large problems one can always build further on Proposition 2 to derive heuristics that quickly (but possibly inconclusively) answer whether or not the data at hand satisfies the MIP restrictions. For example, such an easy-to-implement heuristic uses elementary linear programming methods to verify whether there exists consumption bundles q_t^i that solve the linear equalities (3.4) and (3.5) and the linear relaxation of CS.I.

3.2 Pure exchange economies with other types of assignable information

1. Income lower bounds: An important restriction on the model in the previous section is the requirement that all individual incomes are observed. In reality, data sets often only capture (at best) partial information on the individual incomes, which implies income lower (or upper) bounds. For example, income lower bounds can be defined on the basis of minimum income regulations (e.g., minimum wages) or because only labor income (and not capital income) is observed.⁹ In an extreme scenario, there may be no information at all on the income distribution. Interestingly, our MIP approach can easily be adapted to apply to such settings.

We first introduce some additional notation. The real valued variables $l_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ denote a lower bound on the income of individual i in period t . The associated notion of rationalizability is defined as follows:

⁸By adding for any binary variable x , the constraints $0 \leq x \leq 1$ and $x^2 = x$ we can easily convert any MIP problem into a corresponding LPQC problem.

⁹We only consider the case where we observe a lower bound on individual incomes. Clearly, the case where we have (additional) information on upper income bounds can proceed in a readily analogous manner.

Definition 5. A data set $\{p_t, l_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved utility functions $\{u^i\}_{i=1, \dots, N}$ and a feasible allocation $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ such that for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$:

$$(i) \quad l_t^i \leq \langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle;$$

$$(ii) \quad \{p_t, q_t^i\}_{i \in N} \text{ is a competitive equilibrium.}$$

The interpretation is similar to the one of Definition 4. The main difference is that we no longer fully observe the individual incomes; thus, condition (i) incorporates the income bounds information that is available. The following proposition provides a straightforward extension of Proposition 2.

Proposition 3. A data set $\{p_t, l_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is rationalizable if and only if for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$ there exist vectors $q_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|J|}$ such that:

$$(3.7) \quad \sum_{i=1}^N q_t^i = \varepsilon_t;$$

$$(3.8) \quad l_t^i \leq \langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle;$$

$$(3.9) \quad \{p_t, q_t^i\}_{t \in T} \text{ satisfies CS.I.}$$

Example 1 below shows that the condition in Proposition 3 can be rejected as soon as we have two goods and two observations with strictly positive lower bounds on the income of one individual. Given that we do not assume fully assignable incomes, this conclusion generalizes the result of Brown and Matzkin (1996); these authors have shown refutability of the condition in Theorem 2 for two observations and two goods in the case of fully assignable incomes.

Example 1. For all $|T|, |N|$ and $|J|$ with $|T|, |J| \geq 2$, and real numbers $l_t^i > 0, l_v^i > 0$, there exists a data set $\{p_t, l_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ that is not rationalizable for any feasible allocation $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ with $\langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle \geq l_t^i$ and $\langle p_v, q_v^i \rangle \geq l_v^i$.

It suffices to consider $|T| = |J| = 2$. Let

$$p_t = \left(\frac{l_t^i}{10}, \frac{l_t^i}{100} \right),$$

$$p_v = \left(\frac{l_v^i}{100}, \frac{l_v^i}{10} \right),$$

$$\varepsilon_t = (10, 1),$$

$$\varepsilon_v = (1, 10).$$

We see that $\langle p_t, \varepsilon_t \rangle > l_t^i > \langle p_t, \varepsilon_v \rangle$ and that $\langle p_v, \varepsilon_v \rangle > l_v^i > \langle p_v, \varepsilon_t \rangle$. If the data set is rationalizable, we must have that there exists $\{q_t^i\}_{t=1, \dots, |T|; i=1, \dots, |N|}$ such that:

$$\begin{aligned}\langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle &\geq l_t^i, \\ \langle p_v, q_v^i \rangle &\geq l_v^i, \\ \langle p_t, \varepsilon_v \rangle &\geq \langle p_t, q_v^i \rangle, \\ \langle p_v, \varepsilon_t \rangle &\geq \langle p_v, q_t^i \rangle.\end{aligned}$$

Clearly, this implies a violation of the condition in Proposition 3; the GARP condition for individual i cannot be satisfied.

2. Assignable quantities: Besides assignable income information, the empirical researcher may also have (partial) information on the quantities that are actually consumed by the various agents. For example, we can think of information on car or house ownership, the minimum consumption bundle that is necessary to survive, or specific information derived from a micro-data set. Next, one can often make reasonable assumptions regarding the quantities consumed by individual agents, which may equally define (partially) assignable quantities. See our application in Section 4 for a specific example.

The availability of assignable consumption quantities is easily incorporated in our MIP framework. Indeed, assume that in addition to the data set $\{p_t, I_t^i, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$, we observe assignable consumption bundles $\{q_t^{A,i}\}_{t \in T, i \in N}$ providing us with information on the consumption of each individual i in all observations t . In particular, these assignable bundles impose the condition that:

$$q_t^{A,i} \leq q_t^i, \quad \text{for all } t \in T, i \in N.$$

The corresponding definition of rationalizability is as follows:

Definition 6. A data set $\{p_t, I_t^i, q_t^{A,i}, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved utility functions $\{u^i\}_{i=1, \dots, N}$ and a feasible allocation $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ such that for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$:

- (i) $q_t^{A,i} \leq q_t^i$;
- (ii) $\langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle = I_t^i$;
- (iii) $\{p_t, q_t^i\}_{i \in N}$ is a competitive equilibrium.

Similar to before, we obtain the following characterization:

Proposition 4. A data set $\{p_t, I_t^i, q_t^{A,i}, \varepsilon_t\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ is rationalizable if and only if for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$ there exist vectors $q_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|J|}$ such that:

$$(3.10) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{|N|} q_t^i = \varepsilon_t;$$

$$(3.11) \quad q_t^{A,i} \leq q_t^i;$$

$$(3.12) \quad \langle p_t^i, q_t^i \rangle = I_t^i;$$

$$(3.13) \quad \{p_t, q_t\}_{t \in T} \text{ satisfies CS.I.}$$

3.3 Constant returns to scale production economies with public goods

General equilibrium settings often involve not only (utility maximizing) consumers but also (profit maximizing) producers. Therefore, it seems most useful to analyze the testable implications of general equilibrium models that include production (see also Carvajal (2005)). We will show that production is easily included in our MIP approach. In doing so, we will not only consider private goods but also public goods. This again illustrates the versatility of the proposed MIP framework.

Two preliminary remarks are in order with respect to our modeling of public goods. Firstly, we assume Pareto optimal allocations. Admittedly, in the presence of public goods, a feasible allocation may be Pareto suboptimal. As a matter of fact, this makes it all the more interesting to empirically test whether the Pareto efficiency assumption effectively holds; see also Snyder (1999) for discussion on this Pareto efficiency benchmark in models with public goods and externalities. The MIP characterizations described below allow for conducting such efficiency tests. Secondly, we will assume that the public goods are all positively evaluated by the individuals in the economy. Indeed, Snyder (1999) argued that we need this assumption to obtain refutable models.

We consider the case with $|K|$ public goods, collected in the set $K = \{1, \dots, |K|\}$ and denoted by $Q \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|K|}$. The set of private consumption goods is given by $L = \{1, \dots, |L|\}$ and denoted by $q \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|L|}$. The prices $P \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{|K|}$ and $p \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{|L|}$ stand for the equilibrium prices of the respective types of goods.

We assume that the aggregate endowment of public goods (ξ) and private goods (ε) can be converted to the bundle of consumption goods according to a constant returns to scale production technology. This implies that the equilibrium price vectors, P and p , must satisfy the restriction

$$\langle P, Q - \xi \rangle + \langle p, q - \varepsilon \rangle = 0,$$

where Q and q are the bundles of aggregate consumption. See Varian (1984) and Carvajal (2005) for a detailed discussion on the testability restrictions of the constant returns to scale assumption (as well as possible relaxations).

The utility function of each individual i can be written as $u^i(q^i, Q)$, where q^i ($i \in N$) represent the individual bundles of private consumption goods that add up to the aggregate consumption bundle q . A standard result (see Bergstrom, 1976) is that any Pareto efficient

allocation of publicly consumed goods can be implemented by a set of personalized Lindahl prices $\pi_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{[K]}$ ($t \in T, i \in N$), which must add up to the equilibrium price vector P_t at observation t , i.e.

$$(3.14) \quad P_t = \sum_{i=1}^N \pi_t^i.$$

Given the use of Lindahl prices, we will refer to Lindahl equilibrium instead of competitive equilibrium in the next rationalizability definition. For compactness, we will not include a formal definition of the Lindahl equilibrium concept; but this definition is straightforwardly similar to Definition 3 of the competitive equilibrium concept.

This leads to the following rationalizability concept, which naturally extends the previous definitions.

Definition 7. A data set $\{(P_t, p_t), I_t^i, (Q_t, q_t), (\xi_t, \varepsilon_t)\}_{t \in T, i \in N}$ is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved utility functions $\{u^i\}_{i \in N}$, private consumption bundles $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T, i \in N}$, and Lindahl prices $\{\pi_t^i\}_{t \in T, i \in N}$ such that for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$:

- (i) $\langle \pi_t^i, Q_t \rangle + \langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle = I_t^i$;
- (ii) $\langle P_t, Q_t - \xi_t \rangle + \langle p_t, q_t - \varepsilon_t \rangle = 0$, and
- (iii) $\{(\pi_t^i, p_t), (Q_t, q_t^i)\}_{i \in N}$ is a Lindahl equilibrium .

Once more, rationalizability requires consistency with GARP conditions (or Afriat inequalities). An analogous reasoning as before obtains the following result.

Proposition 5. A data set $\{(P_t, p_t), I_t^i, (Q_t, q_t), (\xi_t, \varepsilon_t)\}_{t \in T, i \in N}$ is rationalizable if and only if for all $t \in T$ and $i \in N$ there exist vectors $\pi_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{[K]}$ and $q_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{[L]}$ such that

$$(3.15) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{|N|} \pi_t^i = P_t;$$

$$(3.16) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{|N|} q_t^i = q_t;$$

$$(3.17) \quad \langle P_t, Q_t - \xi_t \rangle + \langle p_t, q_t - \varepsilon_t \rangle = 0;$$

$$(3.18) \quad \langle \pi_t^i, Q_t \rangle + \langle p_t, q_t^i \rangle = I_t^i;$$

$$(3.19) \quad \{(\pi_t^i, p_t), (Q_t, q_t^i)\}_{t \in T} \text{ satisfies CS.I.}$$

The interpretation parallels to the one of Proposition 2. Again, elementary MIP methods can verify in finite time whether a given data set satisfies the rationalizability conditions. Similar to before, these conditions can accommodate for alternative scenarios in terms of assignable information on individual incomes and private consumption bundles. Given the presence of public goods, assignable information may now also pertain to the Lindahl prices. This will be illustrated in the application that we discuss next.

4 Application

4.1 Set-up

We use a data set retrieved from the US economy. The observations for aggregate consumption (or endowment) levels and prices are obtained from the NIPA tables provided by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).¹⁰ The data set runs from 1997 to 2008, i.e. we have 12 yearly observations ($|T| = 12$). We can use data for 18 good categories ($|J| = 18$).¹¹ Besides information on the aggregate real consumption and associated price deflators, the BEA also provides information concerning the distribution of national income over different parts of the country. In particular, from 1997 onwards they provide information on the allocation of national income across the 50 states (plus 1 national district) and the 8 regions.¹² This information allowed us to compute the incomes, I_t^i , for each of the 8 regions that we consider.

We will consider two model specifications: the first specification assumes that all goods are privately consumed; the second specification assumes that national defense expenditure represents a public good (while all other goods are private). Indeed, defense figures as a prime example of a public good; comparing the test results for the two specifications thus allows us to check whether modeling defense as public or private effectively impacts on the model fit. For each specification, we will consider rationalizability results for alternative degrees of assignable information. Due to limited data availability, we cannot consider production. Specifically, we lack the necessary information on both aggregate consumption and aggregate endowments. Essentially, because we only consider consumption and not production, our below results pertain to necessary conditions for rationalizability in terms of the general equilibrium model with production. Of course, our conclusions directly apply to the model with production under the extra assumption that the endowments are equal to the aggregate consumption (i.e. the restriction (3.17) in Proposition 5 is trivially satisfied).

In what follows, an important focus will be on the discriminatory power of the rationalizability conditions under study. One possible criticism on Revealed preference tests such as ours is that they lack power. Evidently, favorable test results, indicating no violation of the model restrictions, have little meaning if the model implications have low power, i.e. the model can hardly be rejected for the data at hand. Generally, a fair assessment of a particular model should complement a testing procedure with a power analysis. To take

¹⁰All information was obtained via the website: <http://www.bea.gov/>.

¹¹The goods are the following: (i) motor vehicles and parts, (ii) furnishing and durable household equipment, (iii) recreational goods and vehicles, (iv) other durable goods, (v) food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, (vi) clothing and footwear, (vii) gasoline and other energy goods, (viii) other nondurable goods, (ix) housing and utilities, (x) health care, (xi) transportation services, (xii) recreation services, (xiii) food services and accommodations, (xiv) financial services and insurance, (xv) other services, (xvi) national defense expenditures, (xvii) government nondefense expenditures and (xviii) government state and local expenditures.

¹²The regions are the following: (i) New England, (ii) Mideast, (iii) Great Lakes, (iv) Plains, (v) Southeast, (vi) Southwest, (vii) Rocky Mountain and (viii) Far West.

this concern into account, we will compute the power of the different conditions that we consider. Indeed, such power calculations are easily included in the MIP analysis that we propose.

More specifically, Bronars (1987) presented a procedure that is specially designed for defining the probability of detecting ‘irrational’ behavior for Afriat/Varian-type tests; see also Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) and Beatty and Crawford (2009) for recent discussions on alternative power evaluation methods considered in the literature. Bronars’ procedure starts from Becker (1962)’s notion of irrational (or ‘impulsive’) behavior, i.e. behavior that randomly exhausts the available budget. The power of a particular condition is then calculated using Monte Carlo simulations. For each observation t one randomly draws budget shares for each of the $|J|$ goods. Subsequently, from these budget shares one calculates for each of the goods the prevailing quantity ($q_{t,j}$) for the given aggregate budget and price vector. Finally, the rationalizability conditions are verified for this randomized data set. If this is repeated a sufficient number of times (e.g. we use 10,000 iterations in our application), we can compute the power as the fraction of hypothetical data sets that cannot be rationalized (i.e. the fraction of data sets that do not pass the test).

One final remark is in order. Our following analysis pertains to the 8 US regions and not to the 50 states. The reason is that the power calculations would take too long when considering the state level data. For example, checking rationalizability for the state level data (using cplex software on a standard PC configuration for solving the MIP problem) implied a computation time of about 19 minutes for the rationalizability condition associated with all goods private (and no assignable quantities, i.e. $\kappa = 0.0$ in the assignability procedure that we present below).¹³ Because we evaluate 22 rationalizability conditions in total (see Table 1 discussed below), it is directly clear that the above Monte Carlo procedure for calculating the power (with a reasonable number of iterations) would lead to an unrealistic computational effort.

4.2 Results

We first discuss the results for the model with all goods (including defense) private, i.e. we consider Brown and Matzkin’s (1996) original rationalizability condition (see Proposition 2). A first observation is that the condition cannot be rejected. However, as discussed above, this conclusion may also reveal a lack of power rather than an adequate model as such. Bronars’ procedure discussed above (in casu with 10,000 hypothetical data sets) seems to confirm this argument: it obtains exactly zero (!) power for the condition under study.

Given this, we have conceived a procedure that increases the power of the tests by including assignable quantity information (see our discussion in Section 3.2). This assignability procedure starts from a base scenario that defines

¹³As a side note, it is worth reporting that the state level data effectively did pass the rationalizability test, i.e. we could not reject the general equilibrium restrictions.

$$q_t^{B,i} = r_t^i \varepsilon_t,$$

with $r_t^i = I_t^i / \langle p_t, \varepsilon_t \rangle$. In words, this base scenario assumes that private quantities $q_t^{B,i}$ are distributed over individuals (in casu regions) in proportion to the observed income shares $I_t^i / \langle p_t, \varepsilon_t \rangle$. Next, we introduce an assignability parameter $\kappa \in [0, 1]$, and we define

$$q_t^{A,i} = \kappa q_t^{B,i}.$$

The parameter κ captures the extent to which we allow for deviations from the base scenario distribution. For example, $\kappa = 1$ imposes $q_t^i = q_t^{B,i}$, i.e. all quantities are fully assigned. By contrast, $\kappa < 1$ implies $q_t^{A,i} < q_t^{B,i}$. Generally, lower κ values imply less stringent restrictions. Varying the value of κ allows us to evaluate the impact of alternative degrees of assignable quantity information on the test (and associated power) results.

A first observation is that our data set satisfies the rationalizability condition in Proposition 4 for any value of κ . This implies that we cannot reject the assumption that individual consumption bundles are indeed equal to $q_t^{B,i}$. Secondly, the power results in Table 1 suggest that the use of assignable quantities does indeed significantly increase the power of our tests. For example, the power is as high as 64 % for the scenario with $\kappa = 1$. As anticipated, the power of our tests rapidly drops if we decrease κ .

Let us then consider the results for the model that considers national expenditures on defence as a public good. The corresponding test procedure is the one developed in Section 3.3, except -to recall- that we abstract from production (which corresponds to the restriction (3.17) in Proposition 5). We use the same assignability procedure as before for the 17 private goods. As for the public good, we introduce assignable Lindahl prices in an analogous way. In particular, we introduce $\pi_t^{B,i}$ such that (with P_t here the price of defence)

$$\pi_t^{B,i} = r_t^i P_t,$$

i.e. in the base scenario we assume that contribution to defence is proportional to the income share $I_t^i / \langle p_t, \varepsilon_t \rangle$. Correspondingly, we impose the additional restriction

$$\pi_t^i \geq \kappa \pi_t^{B,i}.$$

The interpretation of $\kappa \in [0, 1]$ is directly similar to before.

We get the following results. First, we find that the data set is rationalizable for all values of κ that we consider. Essentially, this implies that we cannot reject the base scenario assumptions (on assignable private quantities and Lindahl prices). Next, the power results in Table 1 are also in line with the results for the previous model specification. Again, the power of this model is quite high (59 %) under fully assignable quantities and prices. However, as soon as we relax the assignability level (i.e. lower κ), the power drops substantially quicker than for the model without a public good.

Overall, we may conclude that the consumption data for the US regions under study can be rationalized in terms of specific general equilibrium models. In fact, this conclusion does not depend on classifying defence as a private or public good. Interestingly, we observe that

Table 1: Power results for general model

Test	Power for basic model	Power for model with public consumption
$\kappa = 1.0$	0.6372	0.5934
$\kappa = 0.9$	0.2946	0.0479
$\kappa = 0.8$	0.1211	0.0084
$\kappa = 0.7$	0.0544	0.0034
$\kappa = 0.6$	0.0333	0.0016
$\kappa = 0.5$	0.0180	0.0008
$\kappa = 0.4$	0.0135	0.0003
$\kappa = 0.3$	0.0088	0.0001
$\kappa = 0.2$	0.0064	0.0001
$\kappa = 0.1$	0.0032	0.0001
$\kappa = 0.0$	0.0000	0.0000

power of the rationalizability tests can be reasonably high. However, the power strongly depends on the assignable information that is available. If no assignable information can be used, then power turns out to be very low. In this respect, it is also worth to recall that our analysis uses only 12 observations per region. Obviously, power can only increase when more observations become available.

5 Concluding discussion

We introduced a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) approach for verifying testable implications on the equilibrium manifold. A core motivation for our MIP approach is that the rationalizability problem for general equilibrium models is *NP*-complete, which suggests using easy-to-implement non-polynomial time algorithms (such as MIP algorithms) for checking rationalizability. Interestingly, our MIP approach naturally allows for dealing with any number of agents and observations. This contrasts with existing approaches, and is particularly convenient in view of empirical applications. We further demonstrated the versatility of our MIP approach by showing that it naturally deals with alternative types of assignable information, and by arguing that it can easily account for production and public goods in the model specification. Finally, we illustrated the practical usefulness of the MIP methodology by means of an empirical application to data drawn from the US economy. In this application, an important focus was on the power of the rationalizability conditions under consideration. We conclude that, for our data set, assignable information (on private quantities and Lindahl prices) is crucial for meaningful (= powerful) tests.

To focus our discussion, we have concentrated on testing consistency with alternative specifications of the general equilibrium model. If observed behavior is consistent with a particular specification (i.e. can be rationalized), then a natural next question pertains

to recovering/identifying the structural features of the model under consideration. For example, such recovery analysis can focus on the individual preferences, individual private quantities, and individual Lindahl prices. Chiappori, Ekeland, Kübler, and Polemarchakis (1999), for example, derived identifiability/recoverability results for general equilibrium models, which enable recovery by starting from some a priori (parametric) specification of the individual utility functions. Because the approach discussed in this paper does not require a (usually non-verifiable) prior specification for the utility functions, it addresses recovery questions by ‘letting the data speak for themselves’ (i.e. it only uses the information that is directly revealed by the data). See, for example, Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) and Varian (2006) for detailed discussions of revealed preference recoverability; these authors consider the basic setting with a single consumer, and thus start from the rationalizability concept in Definition 1. As for the general equilibrium setting considered in this paper, recovery can proceed along the lines of Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2009a), who focused on the MIP revealed preference restrictions of collective household consumption models.

Finally, the rationalizability tests discussed above are ‘sharp’ tests; they only tell us whether observations are exactly consistent with the rationalizability condition that is under evaluation. However, as argued by Varian (1990), exact consistency may not be a very interesting hypothesis. Rather, one may be interested whether the behavioral model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed behavior; for most purposes, ‘nearly optimizing behavior’ is just as good as ‘optimizing’ behavior. This pleads for using measures that quantify the goodness-of-fit of the model under study. In our application, all data passed the rationalizability tests. Thus, the data perfectly fit the rationalizability conditions, which made the goodness-of-fit concern redundant in this case. Still, it is worth indicating that, based on the methodology of Varian (1985) and Varian (1990), our MIP approach allows for taking such goodness-of-fit concerns into account for data sets that do reject rationalizability.

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Appendix: proof of Theorem 3

A *decision problem* can be described by an INSTANCE, the inputs, and a QUESTION, which has either “yes” or “no” as an answer. The general equilibrium rationalizability problem (which we will call RATIONALIZABILITY) can be described as follows:

INSTANCE rationalizability: integers $|T|$, $|N|$ and $|J|$, a data set $\{p_t, \varepsilon_t, I_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ where the elements p_t are strict positive $|J|$ -dimensional price vectors, the elements ε_t are non-negative $|J|$ -dimensional endowment vectors and the numbers I_t^i are non-negative incomes.

QUESTION rationalizability: does there exist a set $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ of positive $|J|$ -dimensional consumption vectors that satisfies conditions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) of Theorem 2.

In what follows, we will use that condition (3.3) is equivalent to the condition that for all i : $\{p_t, q_t^i\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP (see Theorem 1).

A proof of *NP*-completeness proceeds in two steps: first, one has to demonstrate that the problem is in *NP*; and, second, one has to show that it is harder than any other *NP* problem. The way to solve the second problem is to show that a known *NP*-complete

problem is polynomial time reducible to the given problem. In particular, a problem P_1 is polynomial time reducible into a problem P_2 if (i) there exist a function g which maps every instance of P_1 into an instance of P_2 in such a way that a solution I_1 is a “yes” for P_1 if and only if $g(I_1)$ is a “yes” for P_2 , and (ii) $g(I_1)$ can be constructed in polynomial time.

Given all this, to prove Theorem 3, we start by showing that RATIONALIZABILITY is in the class NP . Indeed, given a solution $\{q_t^i\}_{t \in T; i \in N}$ that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2, conditions (3.1) and (3.2) are linear equalities and require only polynomial time to be verified. Also, condition (3.3) can be verified in polynomial time by using, for example, Varian’s algorithm for verifying GARP (which uses Warshall’s algorithm to compute the transitive closure of the revealed preference relation); see Varian (1982) for more discussion.

For the second part of the proof, we need to reduce a known NP -complete problem into an instance of RATIONALIZABILITY. To this end, we use the problem Monotone 3-SAT (M3SAT); see Garey and Johnson (1979) for a discussion of M3SAT.

INSTANCE M3SAT: A set of Boolean variables $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and a set of clauses $\{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$. Each clause is composed of exactly three distinct literals and a literal is either equal to a variable or its negation. The term monotone refers to the restriction that for all clauses, all literals in this clause are either negated or unnegated.

QUESTION M3SAT: Does there exist an assignment to the Boolean variables such that each clause contains at least one true literal? If the answer is “yes” we say that M3SAT is satisfiable.

We say that two clauses in an M3SAT instance are of *opposite signature* if one of the two clauses only contains literals that are unnegated and the other clause only contains literals that are negated.

Step 1: construction of the rationalizability instance

Consider an instance of M3SAT with a set of variables $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and a set of clauses $\{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$. First we create the set of individuals, the set of observations and the set of goods.

- For each variable $x_i \in \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ we create an individual i and these are the only individuals in our economy. This gives us n individuals (i.e. $|N| = n$).
- For each clause $c \in \{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$, we create two observations t_c and v_c and these are the only observations in the data set. This gives us $2m$ observations (i.e. $|T| = 2m$).
- For each clause c , we create a good denoted by $g(t_c, v_c)$. For every pair of clauses c and d of opposite signature, we create two goods $g(v_c, t_d)$ and $g(v_d, t_c)$ and these are the only goods in our economy. Let \mathbf{G} be the set of goods. The cardinality of \mathbf{G} is at most $m + m(m - 1)$ (i.e. $|J| \leq m + m(m - 1)$).

Before we provide the values of the prices, aggregate endowments and income levels, we partition for each observation the set of goods, \mathbf{G} , into five groups. For each clause c and the corresponding observations t_c and v_c , we define:

- $\mathbf{S}(t_c) = \{g(t_c, v_c)\} = \mathbf{S}(v_c)$,
- $\mathbf{S}'(t_c) = \{g(t_d, v_d) \in \mathbf{G} \mid d \neq c\} = \mathbf{S}'(v_c)$,
- $\mathbf{O}(t_c) = \{g(v_d, t_c) \in \mathbf{G} \mid d \neq c\}$ and $\mathbf{O}(v_c) = \{g(v_c, t_d) \in \mathbf{G} \mid d \neq c\}$.
- $\mathbf{O}^2(t_c) = \{g(v_d, t_e) \in \mathbf{G} \mid g(v_d, t_c) \in \mathbf{O}(t_c), g(v_d, t_e) \in \mathbf{O}(v_d)\} - \mathbf{O}(t_c)$ and
 $\mathbf{O}^2(v_c) = \{g(v_e, t_d) \in \mathbf{G} \mid g(v_c, t_d) \in \mathbf{O}(v_c), g(v_e, t_d) \in \mathbf{O}(t_d)\} - \mathbf{O}(v_c)$,
- $\mathbf{E}(t_c)$ contains all goods in \mathbf{G} which are not accounted for in $\mathbf{S}(t_c), \mathbf{S}'(t_c), \mathbf{O}(t_c)$ or $\mathbf{O}^2(t_c)$ and $\mathbf{E}(v_c)$ contains all goods in \mathbf{G} which are not accounted for in $\mathbf{S}(v_c), \mathbf{S}'(v_c), \mathbf{O}(v_c)$ or $\mathbf{O}^2(v_c)$.

Clearly, the above sets have by construction a nonempty intersection and constitute for a given observation a corresponding partition of the set \mathbf{G} . The sets $\mathbf{S}(t_c), \mathbf{S}(v_c), \mathbf{S}'(t_c), \mathbf{S}'(v_c), \mathbf{E}(t_c)$ and $\mathbf{E}(v_c)$ are self explanatory. A good $g(v_d, t_c)$ is in $\mathbf{O}(t_c)$ and $\mathbf{O}(v_c)$ if d and c are opposite clauses. A good $g(v_d, t_e)$ is in $\mathbf{O}^2(t_c)$ if c and d are opposite clauses and at the same time e and d are also opposite clauses; to have an empty intersection with $\mathbf{O}(t_c)$ we demand that e is not equal to c . A similar interpretation holds for a good $g(v_e, t_d)$ in $\mathbf{O}^2(v_c)$.

For each observation we define the prices, p , and the endowments, ε , of the goods by using the set of goods that contains the given goods. These p and ε are given in Table 2 below (prices are between brackets).

Table 2: Endowments and prices

	$\mathbf{S}(t_c)$	$\mathbf{S}'(t_c)$	$\mathbf{O}(t_c)$	$\mathbf{O}^2(t_c)$	$\mathbf{E}(t_c)$
t_c	1 (1)	6 (σ^2)	$1/3 - \sigma$ (σ^2)	$1/3$ (σ^2)	3 (σ^3)
	$\mathbf{S}(v_c)$	$\mathbf{S}'(v_c)$	$\mathbf{O}(v_c)$	$\mathbf{O}^2(v_c)$	$\mathbf{E}(v_c)$
v_c	$1 - \sigma$ (σ)	6 (σ^2)	1 ($1/\sigma$)	3 (σ^2)	3 (σ^3)

For example, a good in the set $\mathbf{S}(t_c)$ has for observation t_c a price equal to 1 and an endowment also equal to 1. For observation v_c the same good (which is in set $\mathbf{S}(v_c)$) has price σ and endowment $1 - \sigma$. We assume that $\sigma > 0$ is a small but strict positive number.

Next, we also need to determine the incomes for each individual in a given observation. For each clause c we have exactly three variables x_i that are contained in a literal of c . The three individuals associated to these variables are the only individuals who have a

strict positive income in the the observations t_c and v_c . That is, we set $I_{t_c}^i = p_{t_c}\varepsilon_{t_c}/3$ and $I_{v_c}^i = p_{v_c}\varepsilon_{v_c}/3$ for each i for which x_i is in a literal of clause c ; we set $I_{t_c}^i = 0$ and $I_{v_c}^i = 0$ for all the other individuals. By construction we considered all observations and, as such, we determined all the individual incomes.

Finally, it is clear that the above construction of the sets of individuals, observations and goods, and the assignment of prices, endowments and incomes can be completed in a polynomial number of steps.

Step 2: M3SAT is satisfiable if the associated rationalizability problem is a “yes” instance

We will need the following two lemmas to prove the result.

Lemma 1. *For each pair of observations t_c and v_c (corresponding to a clause c), we have that if $\sigma > 0$ is small enough, then $p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c} - \varepsilon_{v_c}) > 0$.*

Proof. In order to show the required inequality, we construct Table 3 where each row or column corresponds with a class of goods for the observations v_c or t_c .

Table 3: Differences in expenditures for the different classes of goods

	$S(t_c)$	$S'(t_c)$	$O(t_c)$	$O^2(t_c)$	$E(t_c)$
$S(v_c)$	σ	/	/	/	/
$S'(v_c)$	/	0	/	/	/
$O(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(2)$
$O^2(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	0
$E(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/3 - \sigma)$	$\sigma^2(-8/3)$	0

The entries in the table give the difference in expenditures at price level p_{t_c} for the good common to both the row and column class. By construction, $S(t_c)$ only has goods in common with $S(v_c)$, and $S'(t_c)$ only with $S'(v_c)$. As such we only obtain a difference in expenditures in the two respective cells. For example the cell $(S(t_c), S(v_c))$ only contains the good $g(t_c, v_c)$ and for this good we have that the expenditures in t_c minus the expenditures in v_c (at price level p_{t_c}) equals $1 \cdot (1 - 1 + \sigma) = \sigma$. A similar computation holds for cell $(S'(t_c), S'(v_c))$.

Next, the group $O(v_c)$, again by construction, only has goods in common with $E(v_c)$. As above, one can then compute the difference in expenditures (at price level p_{t_c}): $\sigma^3(3 - 1)$. Thirdly, the group $O^2(v_c)$ also only has goods in common with $E(v_c)$. To see this, assume on the contrary that $g(v_d, t_e) \in O^2(v_c) \cap O^2(t_c)$; the other case is dealt with by construction. This implies that $g(v_d, t_c) \in O(t_c)$ and $g(v_c, t_e) \in O(v_c)$. Now, assume w.l.o.g. that c has all its literals unnegated. This implies that both d and e have all there literals negated. However, then $g(v_d, t_e)$ is not defined in our list of goods, which is a contradiction. The difference in expenditures (at price level p_{t_c}) for the goods common to $O^2(v_c)$ and $E(v_c)$ is

given by $\sigma^3(3 - 3)$.

Finally, the group $E(v_c)$ has thus goods in common with $O(t_c), O^2(t_c)$ and $E(t_c)$, which leads to the respective differences in expenditures.

The total difference of expenditures, $p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c} - \varepsilon_{v_c})$, is of course given by summing for all goods the differences in Table 3. From this table we conclude that if σ is small enough, the term in $(S(t_c), S(v_c))$ dominates the expression $p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c} - \varepsilon_{v_c})$. This value is strict positive since $\sigma > 0$. \square

Lemma 2. *For each pair of observations v_c and t_d (corresponding to clauses c and d of opposite signature) we have that if $\sigma > 0$ is small enough, then $p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - \varepsilon_{t_d}) > 0$.*

Proof. As similar reasoning as in Lemma 1 leads to Table 4. In this case, if σ approaches

Table 4: Differences in expenditures for the different classes of goods

	$S(v_c)$	$S'(v_c)$	$O(v_c)$	$O^2(v_c)$	$E(v_c)$
$S(t_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(1)$	/	/	/
$S'(t_d)$	$\sigma(-17/3 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-4)$	/	/	/
$O(t_d)$	/	/	$(1/\sigma)(\sigma)$	$\sigma^2(2/3 + \sigma)$	/
$O^2(t_d)$	/	/	0	$\sigma^2(2/3)$	$\sigma^3(2/3)$
$E(t_d)$	/	/	/	$\sigma^2(-2)$	$\sigma^3(-2)$

zero, the dominating term in $p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - \varepsilon_{t_d})$ is given by $(O(v_c), O(t_d))$. Again this is strictly positive. \square

Now we are ready to show that M3SAT is satisfiable if the associated RATIONALIZABILITY problem is a “yes” instance. Consider an instance where the RATIONALIZABILITY answer is “yes”. Set the value of the variables x_i such that for each literal in a clause c the value of this literal is equal to one if individual i directly revealed prefers t_c to v_c . Assign arbitrary values to all variables that are not determined in this way.

Lemma 1 guarantees that the RATIONALIZABILITY answer is “yes” only if for each clause c there is an individual i , with strict positive income, such that the individual directly revealed prefers t_c to v_c . Indeed, the available income for observation t_c is equally split over the 3 individuals linked to clause c ; Lemma 1 then implies that for all decompositions of ε_{v_c} , we always have that at least one of these three individuals directly revealed prefers observation t_c over v_c . Hence each clause contains at least one literal with a value equal to one.

So the only thing remaining in order to show that M3SAT is satisfiable, is to verify that two opposing literals can not have the value one at the same time. Assume on the contrary that c contains a literal of variable x_i and d contains the opposite literal of the same variable x_i ; that is, we assume that individual i directly reveals prefers t_c to v_c and t_d to v_d . A similar reasoning as above shows that Lemma 2 implies that this individual i also strict directly revealed prefers v_c over t_d and similarly v_d over t_c . As such we obtain for individual

i the revealed preference cycle $(t_c, v_c), (v_c, t_d), (t_d, v_d), (v_d, t_c)$, which violates GARP since we have a cycle with strict direct revealed preferred relations. This gives us the desired contradiction and thus we conclude that M3SAT is satisfiable.

Step 3: if the m3sat is satisfiable, the associated rationalizability problem is a “yes” instance

To see the reverse, we need to verify that for each satisfiable instance of M3SAT we can find a “yes” instance to the associated RATIONALIZABILITY problem. In order to do this, we need to specify, for a given an solution of M3SAT the consumption bundles q_t^i for each individual i and observation t in such a way that the conditions in Theorem 2 are satisfied.

Consider a satisfiable instance of M3SAT and for each clause, pick exactly one literal which has the value one; for an individual i and a clause c , we say $i \in I(c)$ if this literal corresponds to the variable x_i . We determine the consumption bundles according to whether i is in $I(c)$ or not. In the assignment given in Table 5 below, we only mention individuals with strict positive income, since the consumption for individuals with zero income must of course be zero for every good. Table 5 provides consumption bundles depending on the observation and the type of good. Further, for each clause c we pick one good out of $S'(v_c)$ and we call this good $g(v_c)$; this good will play a role in the proof of Fact 4. The prices are recalled between brackets.

Table 5: Consumption bundles for individuals with strict positive income

$i \in I(c)$						
t_c	$S(t_c)$ 1/3 (1)	$g(v_c)$ 2 (σ^2)	$S'(t_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$ 2 (σ^2)	$O(t_c)$ 1/9 - $\sigma/3$ (σ^2)	$O^2(t_c)$ 1/9 (σ^2)	$E(t_c)$ 1 (σ^3)
v_c	$S(v_c)$ 1/3 - 3σ (σ)	$g(v_c)$ 14/3 (σ^2)	$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$ 2 (σ^2)	$O(v_c)$ 1/3 (1/ σ)	$O^2(v_c)$ 1 (σ^2)	$E(v_c)$ 1 (σ^3)

$j \notin I(c)$						
t_c	$S(t_c)$ 1/3 (1)	$g(v_c)$ 2 (σ^2)	$S'(t_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$ 2 (σ^2)	$O(t_c)$ 1/9 - $\sigma/3$ (σ^2)	$O^2(t_c)$ 1/9 (σ^2)	$E(t_c)$ 1 (σ^3)
v_c	$S(v_c)$ 1/3 + σ (σ)	$g(v_c)$ 2/3 (σ^2)	$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$ 2 (σ^2)	$O(v_c)$ 1/3 (1/ σ)	$O^2(v_c)$ 1 (σ^2)	$E(v_c)$ 1 (σ^3)

Once can easily verify that the sum of the above consumption bundles is indeed equal

to the specified aggregate endowments in 2. Moreover the above specification is also compatible with our specification of the individual incomes (see Step 1). This shows that these bundles satisfy the first two conditions of Theorem 2. To verify the third condition, we need to establish the revealed preference relations for all individuals i .

Fact 1. *For all individuals $i \in I(c)$, if $\sigma > 0$ is sufficiently small, then we have that i strict directly revealed prefers observation t_c to observation v_c .*

Proof. Given that $I_{t_c}^i = p_{t_c}\varepsilon_{t_c}/3$, we need to show that $p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c}/3 - q_{v_c}^i) > 0$. Table 6 is constructed as before.

Table 6: Difference in expenditures

	$S(t_c)$	$S'(t_c)$	$O(t_c)$	$O^2(t_c)$	$E(t_c)$
$S(v_c)$	3σ	/	/	/	/
$g(v_c)$	/	$\sigma^2(-8/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$	/	0	/	/	/
$O(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(2/3)$
$O^2(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	0
$E(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/9)$	0

For $\sigma > 0$ sufficiently small, the entry in $(S(t_c), S(v_c))$ dominates and this value is strictly positive. \square

Fact 2. *Assume clauses c and d have opposite signature. For all individuals i with positive income in v_c , we have that if $\sigma > 0$ is sufficiently small, i strict directly revealed prefers observation v_c to observation t_d .*

Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 2 since $I_{v_c}^i = p_{v_c}\varepsilon_{v_c}/3$. \square

Fact 3. *For all individuals i with strict positive income in observation t_c (or v_c), then if $\sigma > 0$ is sufficiently small, we have that i strict directly revealed prefers observation t_c (or v_c) to any observation where i has zero income.*

Proof. Straightforward. \square

Fact 4. *For all individuals i , if $\sigma > 0$ is sufficiently small, we have that i has no strict directly revealed preference comparisons besides those mentioned by Facts 1, 2 and 3.*

Proof. To prove this, we need to consider every possible comparison between two situations not mentioned in the previous facts. This is a long derivation which is similar to the ones we made before. Therefore, we leave it for the end of this Appendix. \square

We can use these facts to show that every individual satisfies GARP, given that $\sigma > 0$ is sufficiently small. Suppose by contradiction that GARP is violated for individual i . This implies that i must have a revealed preference cycle containing at least one strict direct revealed strict preference comparison. Such a cycle cannot contain observations where i has zero income, since such observations cannot be revealed preferred to observations with strict positive income. Further, it is impossible that the cycle only contains elements v_c for some clauses c , because Fact 4 implies that none of the observations v_c are revealed preferred to each other. As such, there must be a clause c such that the revealed preference cycle contains the element t_c . If the literal associated with x_i in c is zero, then $i \notin l(c)$ and Fact 4 implies t_c is not revealed preferred to any other observations where i has positive income. Hence, the literal associated with x_i in c must be equal to one. Further, Fact 2 and 4 show that the only observations that can be strictly revealed preferred to t_c by i is an observation v_d where d and c have opposite signature. Also, as i has positive income in v_d , it must by construction be that d contains a literal associated with the variable x_i . Fact 4 implies that the only observation that can dominate v_d is the observation t_d and by Fact 1 this only holds if $i \in l(c)$, that is the literal associated with x_i equals one. As such we obtain that both literals in clauses c and d associated with the variable x_i must be equal to one. This is a contradiction with the fact that c and d have opposite signature. Using the equivalence between GARP and the Afriat inequalities (Theorem 1), we therefore obtain that all the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied. Hence, we can conclude that RATIONALIZABILITY is a “yes” instance.

Proof of Fact 4

Fact 3 implies that we only need to consider the pair of observations where in both observations we have a common individual with positive income. We have the following 13 restrictions that need to be satisfied to show that all strict direct revealed preference relations for individual i are captured by the first three facts. (We recall that the strict positive incomes are given by $I_{t_c}^i = p_{t_c} \varepsilon_{t_c} / 3$ and $I_{v_c}^i = p_{v_c} \varepsilon_{v_c} / 3$.)

- clause c
 - (a) for $p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{t_c}^i) < 0$.
 - (b) for $j \notin I(c) : p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c}/3 - q_{v_c}^j) < 0$.
- clause c and d have opposite signature
 - (c) for $i \in l(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^i) < 0$.
 - (d) for $j \notin I(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^j) < 0$.
 - (e) for $p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c}/3 - q_{t_d}^i) < 0$.
 - (f) for $i \in l(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^i) < 0$.
 - (g) for $j \notin l(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^j) < 0$.

- clause c and d have the same signature

- (h) for $p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{t_d}^i) < 0$.
- (i) for $i \in \mathbf{l}(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^i) < 0$.
- (j) for $j \notin \mathbf{l}(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^j) < 0$.
- (k) for $i \in \mathbf{l}(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^i) < 0$.
- (l) for $j \notin \mathbf{l}(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^j) < 0$.
- (m) for $p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c}/3 - q_{t_d}^i) < 0$.

The following thirteen tables of differences of expenditures show that the above inequalities hold if σ is sufficiently small.

case a.

$$p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - \varepsilon_{t_c}/3) < 0$$

	$S(v_c)$	$S'(v_c)$	$O(v_c)$	$O^2(v_c)$	$E(v_c)$
$S(t_c)$	$\sigma(-\sigma/3)$	/	/	/	/
$S'(t_c)$	/	0	/	/	/
$O(t_c)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(8/9 + \sigma/3)$
$O^2(t_c)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(8/9)$
$E(t_c)$	/	/	$1/\sigma(-2/3)$	0	0

For small σ , the term in $(O(v_c), E(t_c))$ dominates. If this cell is empty, we are led to the value in cell $(S(v_c), S(t_c))$.

case b.

$$j \notin \mathbf{l}(c) : p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c}/3 - q_{v_c}^j) < 0$$

	$S(t_c)$	$S'(t_c)$	$O(t_c)$	$O^2(t_c)$	$E(t_c)$
$S(v_c)$	$-\sigma$	/	/	/	/
$g(v_c)$	/	$\sigma^2(4/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$	/	0	/	/	/
$O(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(2/3)$
$O^2(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	0
$E(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/9)$	0

In this case, the term in cell $(S(t_c), S(v_c))$ dominates.

case c.

$$i \in \mathbf{l}(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^i) < 0.$$

	$S(t_d)$	$S'(t_d)$	$O(t_d)$	$O^2(t_d)$	$E(t_d)$
$S(v_c)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 + 3\sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(i, v_c)$	$-13/3$	$\sigma^2(-8/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_c) - \{g(i, v_c)\}$	$-5/3$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-2/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-1/9)$	/
$O^2(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/9)$	/
$E(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	0

If $S(t_d) = g(v_c)$, we need to put the entries in the cells $(S(t_d), S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\})$ and $(S'(t_d), g(v_c))$ equal to /. In that case the cell $(S(t_d), g(v_c))$ dominates. If $S(t_d) \neq g(v_c)$, we need to put the entry in the cell $(S(t_d), g(v_c))$ equal to / and then the cell $(S(t_d), S'(v_c) - g(v_c))$ dominates.

case d.

$$j \notin I(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^j) < 0.$$

	$S(t_d)$	$S'(t_d)$	$O(t_d)$	$O^2(t_d)$	$E(t_d)$
$S(v_c)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 - \sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(v_c)$	$-1/3$	$\sigma^2(4/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$	$-5/3$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-2/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-2/9)$	/
$O^2(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/9)$	/
$E(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	0

The same applies as in case c: If $S(t_d) = g(v_c)$, we need to put the entries in the cells $(S(t_d), S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\})$ and $(S'(t_d), g(v_c))$ equal to /. In that case the cell $(S(t_d), g(v_c))$ dominates. If $S(t_d) \neq g(v_c)$, we need to put the entry in the cell $(S(t_d), g(v_c))$ equal to / and then the cell $(S(t_d), S'(v_c) - g(v_c))$ dominates.

case e.

$$p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c}/3 - \varepsilon_{t_d}/3) < 0.$$

	$S(t_c)$	$S'(t_c)$	$O(t_c)$	$O^2(t_c)$	$E(t_c)$
$S(t_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(t_d)$	$-5/3$	0	/	/	/
$O(t_d)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(8/9 + \sigma/3)$
$O^2(t_d)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(8/9)$
$E(t_d)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/9)$	0

For this case, the term in the cell $(S(t_c), S'(t_d))$ dominates.

case f.

$$i \in I(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^i) < 0.$$

	$S(v_c)$	$S'(v_c)$	$O(v_c)$	$O^2(v_c)$	$E(v_c)$
$S(v_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 + 3\sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(v_d)$	$\sigma(-13/3 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_d) - \{g(v_d)\}$	$\sigma(-5/3 - \sigma/3)$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_d)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(2/3)$
$O^2(v_d)$	/	/	/	/	0
$E(v_d)$	/	/	$1/\sigma(-2/3)$	0	0

It is the entry in the cell $(O(v_c), E(v_d))$ that dominates.

case g.

$$j \notin I(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^j) < 0.$$

	$S(v_c)$	$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_d)\}$	$O(v_c)$	$O^2(v_c)$	$E(v_c)$
$S(v_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 - \sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(v_d)$	$\sigma(1/3 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(4/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_d) - \{g(v_d)\}$	$\sigma(-5/3 - \sigma/3)$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_d)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(2/3)$
$O^2(v_d)$	/	/	/	/	0
$E(v_d)$	/	/	$1/\sigma(-2/3)$	0	0

Again, a distinction has to be made whether $g(v_d) = S(v_c)$ or not. However, in any case it is the entry in the cell $(O(v_c), E(v_d))$ that dominates.

case h.

$$p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - \varepsilon_{t_d}/3) < 0.$$

	$S(v_c)$	$S'(v_c)$	$O(v_c)$	$O^2(v_c)$	$E(v_c)$
$S(t_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(t_d)$	$\sigma(-5/3 - \sigma/3)$	0	/	/	/
$O(t_d)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(8/9 + \sigma/3)$
$O^2(t_d)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(8/9)$
$E(t_d)$	/	/	$1/\sigma(-2/3)$	0	0

In this case, entry $(O(v_c), E(t_d))$ dominates.

case i.

$$i \in I(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^i) < 0.$$

	$S(v_c)$	$S'(v_c)$	$O(v_c)$	$O^2(v_c)$	$E(v_c)$
$S(v_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 + 3\sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(v_d)$	$\sigma(-13/3 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_d) - \{g(v_d)\}$	$\sigma(-5/3 - \sigma/3)$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_d)$	/	/	/	$\sigma^2(-2/3)$	/
$O^2(v_d)$	/	/	$1/\sigma(-2/3)$	0	/
$E(v_d)$	/	/	/	/	0

We can make a distinction between the cases $g(v_d) \in S(v_c)$ and $g(v_d) \notin S(v_c)$. Anyhow, the term that dominate is $(O(v_c), O^2(v_d))$.

case j.

$$j \notin I(d) : p_{v_c}(\varepsilon_{v_c}/3 - q_{v_d}^j) < 0.$$

	$S(v_c)$	$S'(v_c)$	$O(v_c)$	$O^2(v_c)$	$E(v_c)$
$S(v_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 - \sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(v_d)$	$\sigma(-1/3 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(4/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_d) - \{g(v_d)\}$	$\sigma(-5/3 - \sigma/3)$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_d)$	/	/	/	$\sigma^2(-2/3)$	/
$O^2(v_d)$	/	/	$1/\sigma(-2/3)$	0	/
$E(v_d)$	/	/	/	/	0

Again, we can make a distinction between the cases $g(v_d) \in S(v_c)$ and $g(v_d) \notin S(v_c)$. Anyhow, the term that dominate is $(O(v_c), O^2(v_d))$.

case k.

$$i \in I(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^i) < 0.$$

	$S(t_d)$	$S'(t_d)$	$O(t_d)$	$O^2(t_d)$	$E(t_d)$
$S(v_c)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 + 3\sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(v_c)$	$-13/3$	$\sigma^2(-8/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$	$-5/3$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(2/3)$
$O^2(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	0
$E(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/9)$	0

If $g(v_c) \in S(t_d)$, then the entries in $(S(t_d), S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\})$ and $(S'(t_d), g(v_c))$ are empty and the leading term is given by $(S(t_d), g(v_c))$. if $g(v_c) \notin S(t_d)$, then the cell $(S(t_d), g(v_c))$ is empty and the leading term is $(S(t_d), S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\})$.

case l.

$$j \notin I(c) : p_{t_d}(\varepsilon_{t_d}/3 - q_{v_c}^j) < 0.$$

	$S(t_d)$	$S'(t_d)$	$O(t_d)$	$O^2(t_d)$	$E(t_d)$
$S(v_c)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3 - \sigma)$	/	/	/
$g(v_c)$	$-1/3$	$\sigma^2(4/3)$	/	/	/
$S'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\}$	$-5/3$	0	/	/	/
$O(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	$\sigma^3(2/3)$
$O^2(v_c)$	/	/	/	/	0
$E(v_c)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-8/9 - \sigma/3)$	$\sigma^2(-8/9)$	0

If $g(v_c) \in \mathbf{S}(t_d)$, then the entries in $(\mathbf{S}(t_d), \mathbf{S}'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\})$ and $(\mathbf{S}'(t_d), g(v_c))$ are empty and the leading term is given by $(\mathbf{S}(t_d), g(v_c))$. if $g(v_c) \notin \mathbf{S}(t_d)$, then the cell $(\mathbf{S}(t_d), g(v_c))$ is empty and the leading term is $(\mathbf{S}(t_d), \mathbf{S}'(v_c) - \{g(v_c)\})$.

case m.

$$p_{t_c}(\varepsilon_{t_c}/3 - \varepsilon_{t_d}/3) < 0.$$

	$\mathbf{S}(t_c)$	$\mathbf{S}'(t_c)$	$\mathbf{O}(t_c)$	$\mathbf{O}^2(t_c)$	$\mathbf{E}(t_c)$
$\mathbf{S}(t_d)$	/	$\sigma^2(5/3)$	/	/	/
$\mathbf{S}'(t_d)$	$-5/3$	0	/	/	/
$\mathbf{O}(t_d)$	/	/	/	$\sigma^2(\sigma/3)$	/
$\mathbf{O}^2(t_d)$	/	/	$\sigma^2(-\sigma/3)$	0	/
$\mathbf{E}(t_d)$	/	/	/	/	0

The term that dominates in this table is $(\mathbf{S}(t_c), \mathbf{S}'(t_d))$.