Publications

2025

Ispano, A. (2025). The perils of a coherent narrative. Economic Theory, 1-15.

Sémirat, S., & Forges, F. (2025). Converging better response dynamics in sender-receiver games. Accepted in Mathematics of Operations Research. 

2024

Biancini, S., Ettinger, D., & Venet, B. (2024). When pro‐poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 57(1), 225-242.

Forges, F., & Ray, I. (2024). "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 114, 103044.

Forges, F., Koessler, F., & Salamanca, A. (2024). Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 114, 103023.

Ispano, A., & Vida, P. (2024). Designing interrogations. Review of Economic Studies, 91(6), 3504-3531.

Rimbaud, C., Soldà, A. Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition. Exp Econ 27, 491–547 (2024).

2023

Attanasi, G., Rimbaud, C., & Villeval, M. C. (2023). Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 690-717.

Forges, F. (2023). Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information. Revue économique, 74(4), 529-539.

Ispano, A., & Schwardmann, P. (2023). Cursed consumers and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 71(2), 407-440.

Mathis J. (2022), Combien vaut une vie pour l'Etat ?, in , L'Economie Décryptée, Clichy: Éditions Marie B, p. 69-76

2022

Acconcia A., D’Amato M., Martina R., Ratto M. (2022), The response of taxpayer compliance to the large shock of Italian unification, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 73, p. 102-158

Forges, F., & Sákovics, J. (2022). Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm. International Journal of Game Theory, 51(3-4), 589-605.

Sémirat, S., & Forges, F. (2022). Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case. Games and Economic Behavior, 134, 242-263.

2021

Deversi, M., Ispano, A., & Schwardmann, P. (2021). Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure. European Economic Review, 139, 103872.

Dominiak, A., & Lefort, J. P. (2021). Ambiguity and probabilistic information. Management Science, 67(7), 4310-4326.

Gordon, S., Marlats, C., & Ménager, L. (2021). Observation delays in teams and effort cycles. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 276-298.

Gordon, S., Henry, E., & Murto, P. (2021). Waiting for my neighbors. The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(2), 251-282.

Ettinger, D., & Jehiel, P. (2021). An experiment on deception, reputation and trust. Experimental Economics, 24, 821-853.

Forges, F., & Renault, J. (2021). Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval. International Journal of Game Theory, 50, 475-502.

Lécuyer, E., & Lefort, J. P. (2021). Put–call parity and generalized neo-additive pricing rules. Theory and Decision, 90(3), 521-542.